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“Politicians are the same all over. They promise to build bridges…even 







•  Accountability	  and	  Integrity	  
•  Case	  Study	  
•  U,liza,on	  and	  Surplus	  Equipment	  and	  
Infrastructure	  
•  Case	  Study	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OUTLINE 
Iraq	  in	  2003	  
•  US	  forces	  had	  iden,fied	  arms	  
depots	  
•  Depot	  security	  was	  not	  a	  priority	  
•  Depots	  were	  looted	  by	  criminal	  
elements	  and	  mili,as	  
•  The	  lack	  of	  a	  security	  and	  disposal	  
plan	  resulted	  in	  a	  the	  loss	  of	  
millions	  of	  small	  weapons	  
The	  Result	  
•  The	  price	  of	  small	  arms	  fell	  
drama,cally	  in	  civilian	  markets	  
•  A	  buy-­‐back	  program	  was	  
discarded	  because	  of	  fears	  that	  
ci,zens	  would	  use	  the	  funds	  to	  
upgrade	  their	  exis,ng	  small	  arms	  
•  The	  developing	  insurgency	  had	  a	  
ready	  supply	  of	  arms	  
•  Violence	  con,nues	  to	  plague	  Iraq	  
to	  this	  day	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There are markets for weapons.  How these markets operate 











An increase in violence (or expectations of violence) can 














Securing arms depots and disposing of excess weaponry and 









Disposal – Restricting Supply 
8 
•  Economists	  believe	  that	  individuals	  (agents)	  respond	  to	  incen,ves.	  
•  Many	  of	  the	  original	  members	  of	  the	  Mahdi	  Army	  have	  leS	  for	  higher	  
paying	  (and	  less	  risky)	  jobs	  in	  government.	  
•  As	  the	  number	  of	  Mahdi	  Army	  members	  implicated	  in	  criminal	  ac,vity	  
increased,	  a	  Sadr	  City	  sheik	  issued	  a	  religious	  edict	  permiUng	  the	  
confisca,on	  of	  the	  property	  of	  Sunni	  militants.	  
•  This	  incen,vized	  violence	  towards	  Sunnis.	  	  	  
•  The	  result:	  the	  price	  of	  used	  cars	  dropped	  due	  to	  the	  number	  seized	  by	  
the	  Mahdi	  Army	  from	  Sunni	  vic,ms	  of	  violence.	  
An Example of Economic Incentives 
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2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2003-2007
90% of attacks 
5 or less killed 
1% of attacks 
More than 100 Killed 
Source: Iraq Body Count (2007) and author’s analysis 
Why It Is Important to Control Excess Assets 
Culture	  
10 
•  According	  to	  Transparency	  Interna,onal’s	  (TI)	  Corrup,on	  Percep,ons	  
Index	  (CPI),	  countries	  experiencing	  or	  emerging	  from	  conflict	  are	  among	  
the	  most	  corrupt	  
•  Afghanistan,	  Iraq,	  and	  Somalia	  rank	  among	  the	  lowest	  of	  countries	  in	  a	  
variety	  of	  corrup,on	  and	  economic	  indicators	  
•  Conven,onal	  wisdom	  suggests	  that	  the	  conflict	  economy,	  coupled	  with	  
weak	  state	  ins,tu,ons,	  results	  in	  pervasive	  corrup,on	  
•  Pervasive	  corrup,on	  results	  in	  impunity,	  incen,vizing	  further	  conflict	  and	  
corrup,on	  
•  From	  this	  perspec,ve,	  improving	  state	  ins,tu,ons	  is	  key	  to	  reducing	  
corrup,on	  and	  aXenua,ng	  the	  incen,ves	  for	  conflict	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Corruption and Conflict 
•  As	  private	  returns	  to	  corrupt	  behavior	  increase,	  the	  
propensity	  to	  engage	  in	  corrup,on	  increases	  
•  As	  the	  likelihood	  of	  detec,on	  or	  the	  consequences	  of	  
corrup,on	  fall,	  individuals	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  engage	  in	  
corrup,on	  
•  As	  more	  individuals	  become	  corrupt,	  the	  transac,ons	  costs	  
of	  being	  corrupt	  fall	  
•  All	  these	  are	  related	  to	  weak	  state	  ins,tu,ons,	  thus	  
improving	  state	  capacity	  should	  reduce	  the	  propensity	  of	  
public	  employees	  to	  be	  corrupt	  
12 
Corruption and Institutional Capacity 
•  Our	  focus	  in	  many	  cases	  is	  
on	  formal	  ins,tu,ons,	  
thus	  Rule	  of	  Law	  is	  a	  pillar	  
of	  stabiliza,on	  and	  
reconstruc,on	  
•  What	  about	  informal	  
ins,tu,ons?	  	  Behavioral	  
rules,	  social	  preferences,	  




•  As	  violence	  occurs,	  uncertainty	  and	  myopic	  behavior	  
increase,	  nega,vely	  influencing	  the	  social	  contract	  and	  
aggregrate	  norms	  
•  Within	  group	  norms,	  however,	  are	  strengthened	  as	  
individuals	  seek	  to	  reduce	  uncertainty	  by	  engaging	  
with	  those	  of	  the	  same	  tribe,	  race,	  religion	  
•  This	  creates	  a	  second	  incen,ve	  for	  corrup,on:	  the	  
private	  returns	  and	  the	  reputa,on	  it	  provides	  within-­‐
group	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Culture, Corruption, and Conflict 
•  If	  we	  accept	  that	  cultural	  norms	  influence	  economic	  
decisions,	  then	  corrup,on	  is	  influenced	  by	  cultural	  
norms	  
	  
•  If	  we	  want	  to	  reduce	  corrup,on	  in	  a	  environment	  of	  
high	  corrup,on,	  we	  must	  somehow	  orient	  social	  norms	  
to	  focus	  on	  the	  higher,	  non-­‐corrupt	  equilibrium	  
•  “Such	  pathological	  social	  expecta,ons	  can	  be	  changed	  
only	  by	  someone	  who	  is	  perceived	  as	  an	  authority	  or	  





•  AXenuate	  the	  private	  returns	  
to	  corrup,on	  by	  increasing	  
detec,on	  and	  consequences	  
•  This	  requires	  not	  only	  the	  
passage	  of	  laws,	  but	  the	  fair	  
applica,on	  of	  the	  laws	  to	  all	  
public	  employees	  regardless	  of	  
rank,	  religion,	  tribe,	  or	  race	  
•  Building	  ins,tu,onal	  capacity	  
requires	  ,me	  
Cultural	  Capacity	  
•  AXenuate	  the	  reputa,onal	  
benefits	  of	  corrup,on	  by	  
increasing	  the	  disu,lity	  of	  such	  
behavior	  
•  Leadership	  is	  required	  to	  develop	  
and	  foster	  new	  cultural	  norms.	  	  
Leadership	  may	  be	  formal	  or	  
informal.	  
•  We	  are	  asking	  for	  genera,onal	  
shiSs	  in	  norms	  akin	  the	  drunk	  
driving	  or	  cigareXe	  smoking	  in	  
the	  US	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Corruption, Culture, and Institutions 
•  Delega,on	  
–  Some	  cultures	  view	  delega,on	  of	  decision	  making	  as	  a	  norm;	  others	  view	  delega,on	  as	  a	  sign	  
of	  weakness	  
•  Disagreement	  
–  Some	  cultures	  promote	  ac,ve	  disagreement;	  others	  reward	  consensus	  over	  conten,on	  
•  Goal	  seUng	  
–  Goals	  flow	  from	  the	  top	  and	  cannot	  be	  changed	  
–  Goals	  are	  responsive	  to	  the	  inputs	  of	  all	  levels	  of	  the	  organiza,on	  
•  How	  important	  is	  culture?	  
–  When	  you	  enter	  a	  store,	  which	  direc,on	  do	  you	  turn?	  
–  How	  do	  you	  count	  money?	  
–  Should	  you	  obey	  the	  speed	  limit	  when	  driving	  a	  car?	  
–  Understanding	  culture	  is	  as	  important	  as	  promo,on	  laws	  and	  regula,ons	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How Does Culture Shape Decision Making? 
Laws	  and	  Regula,ons	  
•  Are	  you	  allowed	  to	  own	  a	  
personal	  handgun?	  
•  Are	  you	  allowed	  to	  own	  an	  
assault	  weapon	  (AK-­‐74)?	  
•  Are	  you	  required	  to	  register	  a	  
personal	  weapon?	  
•  Are	  you	  required	  to	  report	  a	  
sale	  of	  a	  personal	  weapon?	  
Norms	  
•  How	  are	  personal	  weapons	  
viewed	  historically?	  
–  Individuals	  have	  a	  right	  to	  
defend	  themselves?	  
–  Society	  provides	  protec,on	  
•  Does	  having	  a	  personal	  
weapon	  add	  to	  one’s	  
reputa,on	  or	  honor?	  
•  What	  is	  the	  prevailing	  norm	  on	  




A	  Review	  of	  Public	  Budge,ng	  
19 
•  Review where we have been and where we are 
going 
•  Explore three perspectives of public budgets 
•  Cross-walking different views of the budget 
•  Discuss how strategic, operational, and tactical 
tradeoffs 
20 
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The Components of Public Budgeting 
22 
•  Line-Item Budgeting 
–  The oldest form of 
public budgeting 
–  Input focused: What 
is bought? 
–  Simplest to prepare 
–  No information on 
activities or functions 
Internal Audit Unit FY 2010 FY 2011 
Salaries 507,359 500,359 
Contractual Services 155,925 155,925 
Supplies and Materials 0 0 
Other 2,100 2,100 
Equipment 0 0 
Grand Total 665,384 658,384 
Source: http://www.mcps.k12.md.us/departments/budget 
The Control Perspective 
23 
•  A survey of public primary schools from 1991-1995 
found that, on average, schools received only 13 
percent of the central government’s allocation for the 
school’s non-wage expenditures. 
•  Public officials used most of the allocated funds for 
purposes unrelated to education or captured them for 
private gain (corruption). 
 Reinikka, Ritva and Svensson, Jakob, "Explaining Leakage of Public Funds" (October 2001). World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 270 
Case in Point: Accounting for Leakages 
24 
•  In response to the survey evidence, the central 
government began to publish information on monthly 
transfers in newspapers and on the radio. 
•  The central government also required schools to 
publicly post information on the inflow of funds. 
•  The percentage of central government funds reaching 
primary schools rose from 13 percent in 1991-1995 to 
90 percent in 1999. 
Using the Public to Control Public Corruption 
Line-Item Budgeting 
•  Detailed expenditures are the 
basic unit of decision and 
control 
•  Input data can provide insight 
into issues of economy and 
efficiency 
•  Accountability and control of 
public expenditure are 
necessary for effective 
planning to occur  
The Problem 
•  When the focus of the budget 
is on line-item expenditures, 
policy and planning may have 
little impact on outcomes 
•  The exercise of budgeting 
drives government policy 
•  Tradeoffs that influence 
outcomes are difficult to make 
•  Incrementalism is the norm 
25 
Line-Item Budgeting: Limitations 
26 
FY 2011 
Shared Accountability 646,153 
Internal Audit 658,384 
Policy, Records, Reporting 1,011,462 
Testing 835,678 
Applied Research 791,481 




–  Operational level 
–  Activity focused: 
What is being done? 
–  Links resources to 
tasks and outputs 
–  Managerial focus 







Secondary Total K-12 
Expenditures 
(thousands) 
$965,419 $1,089,391 $2,054,811 
Students 61,162 75,565 137,727 
Cost per 
Student 
$15,531 $14,417 $14,919 
FY 2011 
27 
Source: http://www.mcps.k12.md.us/departments/budget.  
Kindergarten/ 
Elementary 
Secondary Total K-12 
Expenditures 
(thousands) 
$1,013,731 $1,101,907 $2,115,640 
Students 64,811 75,605 140,416 
Cost per 
Student 
$15,641 $14,575 $15,067 
 Examining Productivity 
28 
FY 2011 
Shared Accountability 646,153 
Internal Audit 658,384 
Policy, Records, Reporting 1,011,462 
Testing 835,678 
Applied Research 791,481 
Program Evaluation 674,654 
Totals 4,617,812 
Internal Audit FY 2011 
Salaries 500,359 
Contractual Services 155,925 
Supplies and Materials 0 
Other 2,100 
Equipment 0 
Grand Total 658,384 
Mapping Inputs to Tasks 
29 















Mapping Inputs to Tasks 
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Task 1 = f(I1 , I2 ,…
,In ) 
Mapping Inputs to Tasks 
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FY 2011 Salaries Contracts Supplies Other Equipment Total 
Shared 
Accountability 
616,683 17,079 7,800 4,591 0 646,153 
Internal Audit 500,359 155,925 0 2,100 0 658,384 
Policy, Records, 
Reporting 
976,145 25,286 9,154 877 0 1,011,462 
Testing 827,973 0 7,705 0 0 835,678 
Applied Research 791,481 0 0 0 0 791,481 
Program 
Evaluation 
674,654 0 0 0 0 674,654 
Total 4,387,295 198,290 24,659 7,568 0 4,617,812 
Source: http://www.mcps.k12.md.us/departments/budget 
Mapping Inputs to Tasks 
Planning Budgets 
•  Planning budgets explicitly link 
strategic plans to the allocation of 
resources 
•  Many countries utilize a 
programmatic presentation to link 
plans to resources 
•  A program budget helps senior 
decision makers focus on top level 
resource allocation problems 
•  A program budget can be reoriented 
to an economic, functional, 
organizational classification 
Programs 
•  A program classifies all the activities in 
an organization by their major purpose 
and contribution to overall 
organizational goals and objectives 
•  The program budget is a systems of 
systems approach to the allocation of 
resources in accordance with the 
strategic goals and objectives 
•  A program budget undermines 
incrementalism 
•  Typically, program budgets are built 
within line ministries and not across the 
whole of government 
32 
Plans and Programs: A Strategic Perspective 
33 
•  K-12 Instruction 
•  Curriculum and Instruction (Development) 
•  Organizational Development 
•  Technology 
•  Accountability (Audit/Compliance) 
•  Special Education 
•  Student Services and Alternate Programs 
•  Support Operations 
•  Communications / Other 
An Example of a Program Structure 
34 
FY 2011 Salaries Contracts Supplies Other Equipment Total 
Shared 
Accountability 
616,683 17,079 7,800 4,591 0 646,153 
Internal Audit 500,359 155,925 0 2,100 0 658,384 
Policy, Records, 
Reporting 
976,145 25,286 9,154 877 0 1,011,462 
Testing 827,973 0 7,705 0 0 835,678 
Applied Research 791,481 0 0 0 0 791,481 
Program 
Evaluation 
674,654 0 0 0 0 674,654 




(thousands of $) Salaries Contracts Supplies Other Equipment Total 
K-12 892,408 1,496 28,772 12,944 1,258 936,880 
Organizational 
Development 
18,383 928 514 5,347 21 25,194 
Technology 14,283 7,703 520 4,076 1,347 27,931 




269,464 3,432 3,037 51,887 2,143 329,964 
Support 
Operations 
193,168 10,191 37,154 548,157 12,189 800,861 
Communications 7,436 625 1,899 396 596 10,954 
…. 
Total 1,480,057 25,909 75,050 664,596 17,672 2,263,286 
Source: http://www.mcps.k12.md.us/departments/budget 
Mapping Inputs to Programs 
The	  Issues	  
•  What	  if	  your	  unit	  was	  
responsible	  for	  securing	  an	  
arms	  depot?	  
•  How	  would	  you	  establish	  
control?	  
•  How	  would	  you	  retain	  
control	  over	  ,me?	  
•  How	  would	  you	  map	  your	  
resources	  to	  the	  task	  of	  
controlling	  surplus	  assets?	  
Environmental	  Condi3ons	  
•  Low-­‐level	  criminal	  ac,vity	  is	  
present	  in	  the	  area	  
•  There	  is	  no	  reliable	  physical	  
security	  
•  Corrup,on	  is	  endemic	  
•  There	  is	  a	  significant	  
demand	  for	  arms	  on	  the	  
civilian	  market	  





Surplus	  Ammuni,on	  and	  Weaponry	  
37 
•  In	  this	  sec,on,	  we	  will	  focus	  on	  the	  iden,fica,on	  and	  
disposal	  of	  excess	  ammuni,on	  and	  weaponry	  
•  While	  security	  is	  important,	  it	  is	  not	  the	  only	  dimension	  of	  
the	  disposal	  of	  excess	  ammuni,on	  and	  weapons	  
•  The	  opportunity	  costs	  of	  storing	  and	  securing	  excess	  
ammuni,on	  and	  weaponry	  can	  be	  quite	  significant	  
•  Excess	  ammuni,on	  and	  weaponry	  can,	  without	  proper	  
controls,	  increase	  corrup,on	  and	  undermine	  stability	  
Excess Assets 
The	  Problem	  
•  Excess	  ammuni,on	  and	  
weaponry	  may	  incen,vize	  
conflict	  
•  Excess	  ammuni,on	  and	  
weaponry	  is	  costly	  to	  protect	  
•  Excess	  ammuni,on	  and	  
weaponry	  can	  foster	  
corrup,on	  
Examples	  
•  Securing	  ammuni,on	  is	  difficult,	  on	  
Sept.	  10th,	  2011	  14,000	  rounds	  were	  
stolen	  from	  Ft.	  Bragg,	  N.C.,	  an	  ac,ve	  
duty	  US	  Army	  installa,on	  
•  A	  recent	  theS	  in	  August	  2011	  resulted	  
in	  the	  loss	  of	  ammuni,on,	  flares,	  and	  
other	  items	  from	  a	  Navy	  depot	  in	  New	  
Zealand	  
•  NATO	  and	  others	  have	  expressed	  
significant	  concern	  about	  the	  loss	  of	  
control	  over	  arms	  depots	  in	  Libya	  and	  
the	  poten,al	  prolifera,on	  of	  portable	  
Surface-­‐to-­‐Air	  missiles	  
Excess Assets: Security Risks 
Future	  Conflict	  
•  Es,mates	  suggest	  Libya	  stockpiled	  
“perhaps	  as	  many	  as	  20,000	  MANPADs”	  
•  In	  Iraq,	  a	  2007	  report	  stated	  that	  the	  US	  
s,ll	  did	  not	  have	  know	  how	  much	  was	  
looted	  in	  2003	  or	  how	  many	  sites	  
remained	  unsecured	  
•  "A	  combina,on	  of	  the	  vacuum	  leS	  by	  
planning	  and	  inadequate	  forces	  
fostered	  the	  insurgency.	  Combined	  with	  
the	  unguarded	  muni,ons	  storage	  sites,	  
you	  had	  the	  ingredients	  that	  put	  us	  
where	  we	  are	  today.”	  
•  What	  does	  this	  entail	  for	  the	  prospect	  
for	  current	  and	  future	  conflict?	  
Libya	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Excess Assets: Future Conflict 
Costly	  Protec3on	  
•  The	  storage	  of	  ammuni,on	  and	  explosives	  
can	  never	  be	  100%	  safe	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  
‘absence	  of	  risk’,	  and	  the	  best	  that	  can	  be	  
achieved	  is	  ‘tolerable	  risk’.	  	  
•  The	  risk	  is	  primarily	  dependent	  on:	  
•  The	  physical	  and	  chemical	  condi,on	  of	  the	  
ammuni,on	  and	  explosives;	  
•  The	  training	  and	  educa,on	  of	  the	  personnel	  
responsible	  for	  the	  storage	  and	  surveillance	  
of	  the	  stockpiles;	  
•  The	  handling,	  repair,	  maintenance	  and	  
disposal	  systems	  in	  place;	  and	  
•  The	  storage	  infrastructure	  and	  environment.	  
Lagos,	  Nigeria	  2002	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Excess Assets: Costly Protection 
The	  Problem	  
•  Excess	  ammuni,on	  may	  be	  
inadequately	  stored	  
–  Lack	  of	  physical	  inspec,on	  
–  Lack	  of	  maintenance	  
–  Lack	  of	  safe	  transport	  
•  Excess	  ammuni,on	  may	  pose	  
a	  threat	  to	  public	  safety	  
•  How	  to	  dispose	  of	  this	  
ammuni,on	  safely?	  
Cases	  in	  Point	  
•  In	  August	  2011,	  a	  blast	  in	  an	  
ammuni,on	  storage	  depot	  in	  
southern	  Russia	  killed	  six	  soldiers	  
and	  injured	  12	  
•  The	  explosion	  occurred	  during	  
the	  detona,on	  and	  disposal	  of	  
old	  ammuni,on	  
•  In	  July	  2011,	  more	  than	  200	  
people	  were	  reported	  killed	  in	  
Turkmenistan	  due	  to	  explosions	  
at	  two	  ammuni,on	  deports	  
Excess Assets: Safety Risks 
•  Maintain	  stockpiles	  in	  appropriate	  structures	  
–  Adequate	  climate	  and	  temperature	  control	  
–  Adequate	  physical	  security	  
–  Adequate	  blast	  preven,on	  and	  mi,ga,on	  
–  Adequate	  security	  and	  warning	  systems	  
•  Maintain	  physical	  security	  and	  informa,on	  security	  
–  Access	  control	  to	  authorized,	  veXed,	  and	  trained	  
personnel	  
–  Inventory	  control	  at	  the	  local	  and	  na,onal	  level	  
–  Preven,on	  of	  ‘hacking’	  and	  other	  forms	  of	  informa,on	  
warfare	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Excess Assets: Best Practices 
•  In	  order	  to	  effec,vely	  secure	  excess	  
ammuni,on	  and	  small	  arms,	  there	  must	  be	  
sufficient	  physical	  and	  informa,on	  protec,on	  
•  Maintaining	  this	  effort	  over	  ,me	  is	  costly	  
•  What	  is	  the	  storage	  cost	  of	  a	  5.56mm	  round	  
for	  5	  years?	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Excess Assets: Economically Inefficient 
Securing	  a	  Round	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•  Assume	  that	  an	  ammuni,on	  bunker	  is	  
already	  available	  
•  24/7/365	  manned	  patrol	  
•  Rapid	  response	  armed	  unit	  
•  Ammuni,on	  technicians	  
•  Inventory	  control	  specialists	  
•  Informa,on	  systems	  to	  track	  inventory	  
control	  
•  Personnel	  to	  audit	  inventory	  control	  
Excess Assets: Economically Inefficient 
Iden3fica3on	  
•  The	  Na,onal	  Security	  Strategy,	  
Na,onal	  Defense	  Strategy,	  and	  
Defense	  Planning	  Process	  should	  
iden,fy	  internal	  and	  external	  
threats	  
•  From	  the	  iden,fica,on	  of	  threats,	  
the	  desired	  force	  structure	  is	  
determined	  including	  Ac,ve	  and	  
Reserve	  composi,on	  
•  Desired	  proficiency	  of	  forces	  	  
•  Availability	  of	  storage	  and	  capacity	  
to	  maintain	  and	  secure	  storage	  
Resourcing	  
•  Without	  a	  well	  developed	  
planning	  process,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  
adequately	  determine	  force	  
structure	  
•  Without	  sufficient	  resourcing,	  it	  
will	  be	  difficult	  to	  maintain	  and	  
secure	  ammuni,on	  storage	  
•  Without	  sufficient	  resourcing,	  
force	  proficiency	  declines	  and	  
ammuni,on	  becomes	  more	  risky	  
to	  store	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Excess Assets: Identification 
•  Without	  inventory	  control	  
and	  security,	  excess	  
ammuni,on	  and	  weaponry	  
is	  easy	  prey	  for	  theS	  
•  A	  single	  155mm	  shell,	  for	  
example,	  is	  worth	  between	  
$150-­‐$200	  in	  Iraq	  
•  In	  other	  words,	  a	  single	  
shell	  may	  be	  worth	  more	  
than	  the	  en,re	  months	  pay	  
for	  a	  NCO	  	  
47 
Excess Assets: Corruption 
Security,	  Security,	  Security	  
•  Secure	  the	  site	  and	  provide	  
adequate	  physical	  and	  informa,on	  
security	  
•  Restrict	  access	  
•  Conduct	  a	  complete	  inventory	  
•  Conduct	  an	  ‘arms-­‐length’	  inventory	  
•  Iden,fy	  ammuni,on	  for	  disposal	  
and	  physically	  separate	  from	  
ammuni,on	  to	  be	  retained	  in	  
storage	  
Disposal	  
•  Are	  you	  going	  to	  dispose	  of	  
the	  weapons?	  
–  If	  so,	  task	  to	  EOD	  and	  maintain	  
security	  
–  If	  not,	  how	  to	  ensure	  disposal?	  
•  Are	  you	  going	  to	  sell	  the	  
excess	  ammuni,on	  and	  
weapons?	  
–  While	  it	  could	  provide	  new	  
resources,	  this	  opens	  up	  
another	  avenue	  for	  corrup,on	  
–  It	  may	  be	  best	  to	  have	  an	  
independent	  contractor	  handle	  
the	  sale/transport	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Excess Ammunition: Disposal 
•  Set	  clear	  objec,ves	  and	  performance	  metrics	  
•  Explore	  feasible	  alterna,ves	  
•  Es,mate	  costs	  prior	  to	  disposal	  and	  audit	  costs	  
throughout	  process	  
•  Transparency	  is	  important	  throughout	  this	  
process,	  else	  it	  can	  be	  influenced	  by	  corrup,on	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Excess Ammunition: Performance Indicators 
Objec3ves	  and	  Metrics	  
•  A	  goal	  is	  binary,	  an	  objec,ve	  is	  an	  
ac,on	  taken	  in	  support	  of	  the	  goal	  
•  Clearly	  sta,ng	  goals	  and	  objec,ves	  
is	  important	  for	  communica,ng	  
intent	  to	  the	  organiza,on	  
•  Goals	  and	  objec,ves	  are	  an	  output	  
of	  the	  planning	  process	  
•  Performance	  metrics	  should	  align	  
with	  the	  stated	  goals	  and	  
objec,ves	  
Examples	  
•  Goal:	  Eliminate	  Surplus	  Ammuni,on	  
within	  12	  months	  without	  a	  significant	  
incident	  
•  Objec,ves:	  	  	  
–  Maximize	  disposal	  
–  Maximize	  security	  
–  …	  
–  Minimize	  accidents	  
–  Minimize	  inventory	  loss	  
•  Performance	  Metrics	  
–  Quan,ty	  of	  ammuni,on	  disposed	  
–  Quan,ty	  of	  lost	  ammuni,on	  
–  Number	  of	  significant	  accidents	  
–  Number	  of	  security	  incidents	  
–  Timeliness	  of	  disposal	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Excess Ammunition: Performance Indicators 
Asset	  Disposal	  
Infrastructure	  and	  Other	  Items	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•  Many	  Ministries	  and	  Departments	  of	  Defense	  have	  a	  
surplus	  of	  non-­‐weapon	  assets,	  disposing	  of	  these	  assets	  is	  a	  
challenge	  
•  The	  disposal	  of	  these	  unproduc,ve	  assets	  presents	  
opportuni,es	  for	  theS,	  bribery,	  and	  other	  forms	  of	  
undesired	  behavior	  
•  As	  with	  weaponry,	  the	  first	  task	  is	  to	  ensure	  the	  assets	  are	  
properly	  secured	  
•  Once	  secured,	  the	  assets	  require	  a	  proper	  valua,on	  and	  
then	  an	  open,	  auditable	  disposal	  process	  
Excess Assets: Disposing of Infrastructure 
•  The	  planning	  process	  should	  determine	  the	  desired	  capabili,es	  and	  force	  structure	  
to	  generate	  those	  capabili,es	  
•  An	  excess	  property	  department/commission	  should	  then	  be	  able	  to	  publicly	  map	  
these	  capabili,es	  to	  exis,ng	  assets	  to	  determine	  whether	  excess	  infrastructure	  
and	  assets	  exist	  
•  An	  ini,al	  disposal	  list	  should	  then	  be	  publicly	  generated	  for	  public	  comment	  and	  
discussion	  as	  well	  as	  discussion	  within	  the	  MoD	  and	  with	  the	  Parliament	  
•  The	  excess	  property	  department/commission	  would	  then	  be	  responsible	  for	  
conduc,ng	  an	  assessments	  of	  the	  costs	  and	  benefits	  of	  maintaining	  or	  disposing	  of	  
the	  assets	  
•  A	  final	  list	  is	  then	  submiXed	  to:	  
–  For	  minor	  assets,	  MoD	  
–  For	  major	  assets,	  MoD	  and	  Parliament	  
	  
Step 1: Determine Excess Assets 
•  Once	  the	  disposal	  list	  is	  published,	  the	  next	  step	  is	  to	  determine	  
how	  the	  MoD	  should	  dispose	  of	  excess	  infrastructure	  and/or	  assets	  	  
•  The	  disposal	  process	  can	  take	  two	  variants:	  
–  Market	  sale	  
–  Transfer	  to	  another	  level	  of	  government	  
•  Whether	  the	  excess	  is	  sold	  or	  transfer,	  all	  transac,ons	  must	  take	  
place	  in	  a	  transparent	  manner	  
•  The	  MoD	  may	  place	  restric,ons	  on	  the	  further	  use	  of	  assets	  or	  may	  
have	  to	  pay	  for	  the	  remedia,on	  of	  assets.	  	  A	  full	  life	  cycle	  cost	  
accoun,ng	  for	  disposal	  is	  an	  important	  part	  of	  this	  process	  
	  
Step 2: Determine Disposal Process 
Transfer	  
•  In	  1994-­‐1995,	  the	  Army	  closed	  Ft.	  
Ord	  
•  Before	  transferring	  the	  property	  to	  
local	  governments,	  the	  Army	  is	  
responsible	  for	  removing	  chemicals	  
and	  unexploded	  ordinance	  
•  The	  cost	  of	  remedia,on	  is	  now	  
es,mated	  more	  than	  $500	  million.	  	  
•  This	  cost	  is	  significantly	  more	  than	  
the	  an,cipated	  savings	  from	  the	  
base	  closure	  
Ft.	  Ord,	  CA	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Step 2: Determine Disposal Process 
Sale	  
•  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  there	  may	  be	  
assets	  and	  infrastructure	  that	  
warrant	  a	  private	  sale	  
•  In	  some	  cases,	  small	  military	  bases	  
located	  in	  ci,es	  are	  oSen	  costly	  
and	  militarily	  inefficient	  
•  In	  other	  cases,	  the	  military	  may	  be	  
running	  private	  businesses	  
•  Reducing	  these	  assets	  not	  only	  
reduces	  the	  likelihood	  of	  
corrup,on	  but	  also	  brings	  
resources	  into	  the	  government	  
Peru	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Step 2: Determine Disposal Process 
•  The	  military	  in	  Peru	  not	  only	  
manages	  tradi,onal	  bases	  and	  
depots,	  but	  also	  airports,	  hotels,	  
and	  other	  types	  of	  infrastructure	  
•  Many	  of	  these	  assets	  displace	  
private	  compe,tors	  and	  obscure	  
the	  military’s	  budget	  
•  Many	  of	  these	  assets	  may	  also	  be	  
economically	  inefficient	  
•  Holding	  a	  private	  valua,on	  and	  sale	  
could	  be	  of	  benefit	  to	  the	  Peruvian	  
government	  
Private	  Sale	  
•  A	  private	  sale	  should	  be	  conducted	  in	  a	  transparent	  
manner	  and	  should	  be	  at	  arms-­‐length	  
•  Prior	  to	  the	  pos,ng	  for	  sale,	  the	  scoring	  criteria	  
should	  be	  publicly	  posted	  
•  The	  terms	  and	  condi,ons	  of	  sale	  should	  be	  publicly	  
posted	  and	  bids	  made	  in	  a	  sealed	  manner	  
•  Bids	  are	  not	  revocable	  or	  alterable,	  bidders	  are	  
required	  to	  post	  a	  surety	  bond	  
•  Sealed	  bids	  should	  be	  opened	  and	  scored	  by	  an	  
independent	  body	  that	  is	  disinterested	  in	  the	  sale	  of	  
the	  asset	  
•  All	  bids	  should	  be	  publicly	  disclosed	  at	  the	  ,me	  of	  
award	  so	  losers	  may	  challenge	  the	  winner	  
Government	  Transfer	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Step 3: Disposal Process 
•  In	  a	  government	  to	  government	  transfer,	  
there	  is	  a	  dis,nct	  need	  to	  protect	  the	  
recipient	  government	  
•  The	  transferee	  has	  an	  incen,ve	  to	  
understate	  the	  costs	  associated	  with	  the	  
asset	  
•  Many	  costs	  may	  also	  not	  be	  known	  at	  the	  
,me	  of	  transfer.	  Unexploded	  ordinance,	  for	  
example,	  may	  not	  be	  known	  un,l	  new	  
construc,on	  occurs	  
•  A	  standard	  cost-­‐sharing	  agreement	  should	  be	  
developed	  and	  posted	  to	  ensure	  that	  a	  local	  
government	  does	  not	  have	  to	  pay	  for	  
unforeseen	  remedia,on	  costs.	  
•  Disposal	  of	  surplus	  assets	  is	  very	  difficult	  
–  Invest	  the	  ,me	  to	  set	  up	  a	  transparent,	  replicable	  process	  
–  Invest	  the	  ,me	  and	  resources	  to	  accurately	  cost	  the	  costs	  and	  
benefits	  of	  disposing	  of	  assets	  
–  Avoid	  “fire	  sales”	  	  
–  Consider	  contrac,ng	  out	  to	  interna,onally	  reputable	  firms	  
•  Disposal	  of	  assets	  can	  create	  poli,cal	  issues	  
–  The	  rapid	  and	  ill-­‐planned	  disposal	  of	  Soviet	  assets	  concentrated	  
wealth,	  increased	  corrup,on,	  and	  s,fled	  compe,on	  
–  Op,mis,c	  planning	  undermined	  some	  of	  the	  benefits	  
associated	  with	  the	  US	  base	  closure	  process	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